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Definitions
Debureaucratization A complex set of reforms
in the public sector,
bringing changes
especially to the
ownership and
management of public
enterprises.
Power The source of electrical
energy used for socio-
economic development.
Introduction
Electricity is a major source of power, a critical
infrastructure that is strategic to a nation’s socio-
economic development. Therefore, this provides a
rationale for most government involvement in its
ownership or management. In Nigeria, the Federal
Government (FG) merged Electricity Company of
Nigeria (ECN) and Niger Dams Authority (both
were established to distribute and generate power
respectively before independence in 1960) to
establish National Electric Power Authority
(NEPA) with the task of producing and distribut-
ing electricity (Tinuoye 2017).
However, NEPA’s inability to live to its respon-
sibility of meeting customers’ (household and
commercial) electricity demands sparked criti-
cism from stakeholders. Ajumogobia and Okeke
(2015) identiﬁed various challenges to the deliv-
ery of quality service such as: inadequate power
generation, low connection rate, inefﬁcient usage
of capacity, limited access to infrastructure, insuf-
ﬁcient transmission, and distribution facilities,
among others. Meanwhile, many of the public
service reform commissions set up by FG to
review public service efﬁciency suggested the
following options: merger, downsizing, privatiza-
tion, or commercialization of public enterprises.
Thus, debureaucratization, an omnibus concept,
depicting incremental changes to fast-changing
post-industrial society in public administration
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occasioned by an ideological shift from monistic
to pluralism perspectives or closed to open sys-
tems, and technological progress (Argyriades
2010), of the power sector was considered a ver-
itable option, speciﬁcally, privatization.
It becomes imperative that government had to
opt for NEPA privatization, especially after its
initial commercialization in 1989 made negligible
impact on effective and efﬁcient service delivery
to its increasing customers. Hence, the Power
Sector Reform Bill (PSRB) was initiated and
signed into law in 2005 under President
Obasanjo’s administration. This was done with
the intent of ending NEPA’s monopolistic opera-
tion and providing a legal framework for the
reform in a non-competitive market, in order to
ensure efﬁcient and effective power sector Con-
sequently, the bill enabled participation of the
private sector in the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electricity while ﬂoating the
Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) as
successor to NEPA with provision for its
unbundling into eleven distribution companies
(DISCOs), six generating companies (GENCOs),
and one transmission company (TCN), and
establishing National Electricity Regulatory
Commission (NERC) as the sector’s overseer
alongside Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trading Plc
(NBET) serving as bulk buyer/intermediary
between the GENCOs and DISCOs (Enoche
et al. 2015).
Therefore, this entry’s central objective is to
offer insights into the structural composition of
the Nigeria’s power sector reform; examine the
reform’s theoretical underpinning; and descrip-
tively analyze the post-reform experience upon
which the current position of the sector’s reform
is anchored.
Underpinning Theory
Privatization is a concept that has metamorphosed
to acquiring a theoretical status currently due to its
increasing popularity, acceptance, and application
by many countries as a public sector reform
instrument. This begins from the 1970s after the
United Kingdom (UK) and United States of
America (USA) adopted, and championed its
global promotion. Privatization theory is pivoted
on liberal economy tenets, notably, a total disen-
gagement of the public interest for active involve-
ment of private ﬁrms in a country’s production
and service industries, and government active
facilitator’s role in the economic management.
This emphasizes the promotion of effective and
efﬁcient service and productivity if employed by a
state predicated on a liberalized operating envi-
ronment (Muogbo 2013).
The anticipated improved performance of the
public enterprise via privatization informed its
choice for Nigeria’s electricity sector’s reform,
and the altruistic and faithful implementation of
the reform implies that the lackluster performance
of NEPAwould become history. However, by and
large, the essence of privatization policy as a
prime among other tools of New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) in Nigeria has not yielded the desir-
able results (Ibietan 2019). While the post-
privatization performance of the power sector is
a subject of debate among scholars, stakeholders,
and operators, the submission seems to reﬂect the
picture of its current position, especially based on
a cross-country performance comparison. The
next section highlights the structure and features
of the power sector reform in Nigeria.
Structure and Features of the Power
Sector Reform in Nigeria
The unbundling of NEPA’s into 18 units charac-
terized by 11 DISCOs and 6 GENCOs with the
TCN operating under a management contract
agreement, “described as one of the boldest initia-
tives globally” (Tinuoye 2017, p. 2). The distri-
bution companies are Abuja, Benin, Ikeja, Eko,
Ibadan, Enugu, Jos, Kano, Portharcourt, Kaduna,
and Yola, while the generating companies consist
of Egbin, Kainji/jebba, Shiroro, Sapele, Geregu,
and Afam, and the TCN was initially managed by
Manitoba Hydro International (MHI) but was
reverted to the government in 2016 after the expi-
ration of the contract without stating any clear-cut
2 Debureaucratization of Power in Nigeria
basis. Moreover, it is important to note that a
DISCO covers an average of three states within
the country, except Eko and Ikeja, that operate
within Lagos State with extension to adjoining
cities in the neighboring Ogun State. Of the six
GENCOs, only Kainji/Jeibba and Shiroro are
hydro-power stations but others generate electric-
ity through gas thermal technology with Egbin
having the highest installed capacity of
1320 MW (Tinuoye 2017).
Furthermore, the size of the country largely
accounted for the adoption of a horizontal
unpacking separating the DISCOs and GENCOs
into the regional operational bases, differing
markedly from what is obtainable in other African
countries. As such, the structural and institutional
designs are tailored to meeting the vast space and
high population features of Nigeria. Also, to
increase power supply, the PSRB provides for
government’s establishment of National Inte-
grated Power Projects (NIPP), and Independent
Power Producers (IPP), owned and managed by
the private power generating ﬁrms to complement
the GENCOs’ capacity (Okafor et al. 2015). In
this sense, aside from increasing the generation
capacity, the participation of the IPPs is also a
strong indication of the existence of a liberaliza-
tion regime affording competition in the sector, to
some extent.
It is also interesting to note that though the
overarching objective of the power sector privat-
ization is to achieve maximum efﬁciency in the
sector’s value chain, the measure equally gener-
ated revenue for the government. This was coor-
dinated by the National Council on Privatization
(NCP) that warehoused the privatization exercise,
while the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE)
discharged administrative duties. However, since
2013 that the private companies took charge of the
DISCOs and GENCOs operations, and noting that
government retains 40% and 20% ownership
shares, respectively, service delivery is still low
and continue to ebb, with complains and criticism
being unleashed on both the government and
power sector operators, most especially, the
DISCOs interfacing with the electricity end-
users. This calls for urgent and more robust
actions or strategy for effective reform outcomes.
The Post-reform Experience
The power sector is naturally interdependent and
runs on the network of a tripod, namely: genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution. This systemic
operation makes disruption at a point to interrupt
the effectiveness of the other binary. In other
words, an increase in the power generation with-
out a commensurate capacity for wheeling would
not only make the energy wasted (because it can-
not be conserved), but also deprive the distribu-
tion end of electricity for the customers.
Therefore, it is difﬁcult to isolate the consequen-
tial effects of the challenges at any of the treble
value chain from one another.
Although, the entrance of the private investors
in the generation and distribution ends have raised
the sense of responsibility to customers, unlike the
pre-reform era characterized by negligence of
duty and other bureau pathologies that exacer-
bated poor service delivery, there are ticklish and
unabating issues highlighted in this issue and pro-
active measures canvassed to redress the palpable
state of affairs through a more effective power
sector reform.
Operators’ Capacity
It is noteworthy that the power sector is capital
intensive. However, the reform is yet to provide
lasting solutions to the challenges of the huge cost
of generation, weak transmission, and efﬁcient
distribution according to Enoche et al. (2015).
Implicitly, the new operators are yet to manifestly
display ﬁnancial adequacy, managerial and tech-
nical capabilities required to optimize the facilities
bequeathed to them for improved service delivery.
Additionally, the “legacy debt” (debt of the gov-
ernment Ministries, Department, and Agencies
(MDAs)) to DISCOs worsen their illiquidity,
making the DISCOs to continually clamor for
government’s funding support despite the Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) intervention fund
received in 2016. The criticism by civil society
organization on government subsidy to private
ﬁrms, and government’s justiﬁcation of its action
as necessary to stabilize the sector, are quite
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illuminating here, even as NERC threatens to
cancel eight DISCOs licenses due to 30.1 billion
debts to NBET (Simon 2019), are poignant evi-
dences of the shortcomings of the power sector
reform.
A related study shows that customers’ assess-
ment of some DISCOs using the electricity sup-
ply, load shedding, pricing/metering, response to
customers, and coverage area indices afﬁrms
gross underperformance (Idowu et al. 2019).
Hence, it is instructive that a collaborative syn-
ergy of resources and efforts between the govern-
ment and new managers of the sector to
recalibrate the processes leading to enhanced per-
formance is urgently required.
Similarly, the current level of technical losses
to electricity generation via differences between
the installed and generation capacity; loss to dis-
tance in the course of power transmission; and
theft by customers at the distribution end demand
a review to minimize its adverse effects on the
network. Furthermore, the national grid system
appears to be a burden on the efﬁciency drive of
the value chain. Tinuoye (2017, p. 4) posits that in
Nigeria, 90% of electricity output is supplied
through the national grid. The negative conse-
quences of this on the national life can be colossal
in the event of grid collapse or hitches. Thus,
alternative grid methods such as mini-grid or off-
grid system are imperative to, ﬁrst, minimize
chances of national power outage and, second,
entrench some degree of stability in the power
network.
Regulatory Environment
The regulatory environment is a crucial and irre-
ducible requirement for the operation of electric-
ity business, more importantly in a liberalized
regime. NERC is empowered by ESPRA to regu-
late the sector operators, protect customers, medi-
ate between the DISCOs and customers, and
between operators, and ensure fairness to all
stakeholders. Nonetheless, with the prevalence
of estimated billing system inﬂating the cost of
energy consumed by customers to the advantage
of the DISCOs, and recorded cases of energy
pilfering, bypassing of meters, and similar
indecent practices by customers, the business
environment can be said to be poorly regulated.
To inject sanity into the sector, NERC needs to
improve its supervisory role and be more proac-
tive in attending to stakeholders concerns, more
importantly by making customers’ access to pre-
paid meters and ensuring that punishment for
infractions are strong to act as deterrent to real
and potential offenders.
Political Considerations
The conﬂict between the national and individual
or sectional interests is an albatross to transpar-
ency, credibility, and sanctity of both the pre- and
post-privatization process and management,
respectively. This is typiﬁed by overbearing inﬂu-
ence of political considerations in the decision
making before the unpacking of the electricity
sector and post-reform regimes, observed and
lampooned by the civil society groups, interest
groups, and some of the citizens. For instance,
the liberal precept of market determination of
electricity price in the post-privatization era is
restrained because the government regulate retail
price, making the tariff to be lower than the eco-
nomic reality. Consequently, the non-economic
reﬂective price is characterized by poor return on
investment for the private operators, speciﬁcally,
the DISCOs.
As a corollary, political considerations and
graft tendencies of political leaders and bureau-
crats account for the non-transparency of the bid-
ding and award processes of DISCOs and
GENCOs, manipulations of rules and disregard
for extant laws, prevalence of inexperienced oper-
ators in the power sector, and Bureau of Public
Enterprises’ (BPE) permission to defer payments
and manipulation of payment terms, contravening
the bidding rules to the disadvantage of co-bidders
(Socio-Economic Right and Accountability Pro-
ject (SERAP) 2017) are emblematic of the reform
process. In light of this, it is discernible that the
pre-reform trajectory largely accounts for the cur-
rent weak position, and contributes (to some
extent) to the post-privatization poor regulatory
environment.
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Conclusion
This entry highlights the debureaucratization of
the power sector in Nigeria. The failure of NEPA
as a public enterprise to effectively provide qual-
ity power supply to the residential and commer-
cial customers not only attracted criticism but
impacted negatively the nation’s social and eco-
nomic development. Thus, privatization of the
power sector value chain was considered as pan-
acea to epileptic electricity supply. This step led to
the private ownership and management of the
6 GENCOs and 11 DISCOs in 2015 while TCN
operates under a management contract until 2016
when it expired making the FG to regain its man-
agement. This was accomplished with the aid of
the PSRB act that provides the legal framework,
the establishment of NERC as the sector’s regula-
tor, and NIPP and IPP to complement the genera-
tion capacity of the GENCOs. It is noted that
while the reform raised the current operators’
sense of responsibility, the systemic failure of
the value chain circumscribed optimum
performance.
Moreover, the post-reform analyses reveal the
sector’s inadequacies, jeopardizing effective, and
efﬁcient network functioning. The GENCOs and
DISCOs’ ﬁnancial, technical, and management
incapacity as private entities conjoin to adversely
affect stable electricity experience by customers.
And, the GENCOs, TCN, and DISCOs inability
to minimize their technical losses further aggra-
vates their technical deﬁcit, while the inability of
NERC in curbing the prevalence of estimated
billing system with the provision of pre-paid
meters, and bringing to the barest minimum the
unwholesome behaviors of consumers,
compounded the operators’ challenges, pre-
senting the regulatory environment as uncertain
and deprived stakeholders’ of conﬁdence. Also,
undue politicization in the pre- and post-
privatization regimes resulted in the emergence
of inexperienced bidders and unsound manage-
ment decisions, respectively. The culmination of
these deﬁciencies is poor service delivery by the
network operators manifesting in the current poor
quality power supply to consumers.
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